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1.  Introduction 
 
It is conviction of many, whether economists or not, that high marginal tax 
rates tend to encourage taxpayers to cheat on their income. For example, according to 
Feldstein  (1995),  «high  marginal  tax  rates  may  induce  taxpayers  to  take  more 
‘aggressive’ interpretations of the tax rules (e.g., claiming questionable deductions) 
or even to evade taxes by understating income or claiming unjustified deductions» 
(p. 555). 
As it is well known, however, this intuition is at odd with the most classical 
portfolio approach to tax evasion, as originally developed by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) and Yitzhaki (1974). In that model, a taxpayer receives an exogenous income, 
which she would possibly completely conceal to the tax authorities, but is deterred 
from such activity by the threat of being caught and convicted to pay a penalty. 
Assuming DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion), Allingham and Sandmo (1974) 
originally showed that, in such a model, the effect of an increase in the marginal tax 
rate on evaded income is ambiguous when the sanction is proportional to evaded 
income; lately, however, Yitzhaki (1974) showed that when the penalty surcharge is 
proportional to evaded taxes, as it is indeed most often case in many countries, the 
effect is unambiguously negative.  
The  portfolio  approach  is  very  simple,  as  it  treats  tax  evasion  as  a  pure 
gambling decision. Subsequent developments have been in the years conducted in 
various directions. Among others, there have been studies which have (see Andreoni 
et  al 1998,  for  a  comprehensive  review):  endogenized  pre-tax  income  by  adding 
labour supply; extended the basic framework to account for considerations of public 
expenditure, moral sentiments, public goods; introduced various sources of imperfect 
information; modelled different forms of strategic interaction (between taxpayers and 
the  tax  authority,  between  taxpayers  and  tax  practitioners,  among  taxpayers 
themselves).  These  developments  have  indeed  documented  that,  in  more  general 
settings than the basic set-up with exogenous income and penalty proportional to 
evaded  tax  (henceforth,  the  ASY  set-up  from  Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki),  the 
simplest prediction of a negative relationship between tax rates and evaded income is 
no longer unambiguous, but it depends to an increasing degree on the relative size of 
the various parameters at play.    2 
The empirical literature has for some respects shown an even greater degree 
of inconclusiveness.  In  particular, in an early  econometric studies from the field, 
Clotfelter (1983) concluded that higher tax rates tend to stimulate evasion; but his 
findings were later questioned by some, including, Cox (1984), Slemrod (1985) and 
Feinstein (1991). On the other hand, experimental studies, designed to essentially 
mimic the basic ASY set-up, have typically found that high tax rates are associated 
with greater evasion (see, for example, Friedland et al. 1978, Bradley 1987,  and Alm 
et al. 1992). Thus, if on the one side some ambiguity of the econometric field studies 
could perhaps be expected in view of the difficulty to identify definitive comparative 
static predictions in sufficiently general settings, the experimental findings have been 
considered most contradictory in regards to the basic portfolio model. 
In this paper we report the results of an experiment which is again focused on 
the  simplest  ASY  set-up,  but  designed  to  test  for  the  importance that  “reference 
dependent preference” may have on tax evasion decision, as suggested in a recent 
paper by Bernasconi and Zanardi (2002).  
Specifically,  Allingham  and  Sandmo  (1972),  Yitzhaky  (1974),  as  well  as 
most  of  the  subsequent  generalizations  have  been  conducted  within  the  classical 
expected utility framework.  In  expected utility, it is final wealth positions which 
enter  the  utility  function.  Opposing  this  tenet,  however,  there  is  now  a  vast 
psychological  and  sociological  literature  asserting  that  an  individual’s  happiness 
depends, rather than on final states, on a reference level of income against which he 
compares his wealth position: if this is above the reference income, he accounts for a 
gain and experiences pleasure; if it is below the reference income, he accounts for a 
loss and experiences pain (see Kahneman et al. 1999, for a comprehensive account 
of this literature).  
The determination of the reference income is clearly a crucial issue in this 
literature.  According  to  classical  studies  including  Duesemberry  (1949),  Adams 
(1963), Runciman (1966), Berkowitz et al. (1987), and the many quoted in Argyle 
(1999), comparison with others may be an especially important source of income 
satisfaction  or  dissatisfaction,  since  it  may  produce  a  sense  of  inequity,  envy, 
jealousy or relative deprivation. 
The  distinction  between  happiness  measured  in  terms  of  absolute  wealth 
states and differences with respect to reference levels is important, since it is further   3 
argued that individuals are far more sensitive to losses, than to commensurable gains. 
An implication of this is that a person in the loss domain may be willing to accept 
more risk than he would be willing to run if he were in the gain domain. In fact, as 
assumed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in Prospect Theory, the hypothesis is that 
individual are risk averse in the gain domain, but risk loving in the loss domain. 
In Bernasconi and Zanardi (2002), Prospect Theory is a applied to a standard 
ASY set-up and it is shown that a taxpayer’s behavior may change depending on 
whether the disposable income he would obtain if he had paid all his tax liability is 
higher or lower than the reference income. If it is higher so that the taxpayer is in the 
gain domain, the taxpayer behaves as in the standard expected utility model and, 
among other things, evades less as the tax rate increases; if, on the other hand, it is 
lower,  the  taxpayer  sees  taxes  paid  as  a  loss;  and  responds  to  increases  in  the 
marginal tax rate by evading more.  
While the idea of reference income is, we believe, very intuitive,  a test of the 
model based on field behaviour is very complicated, mainly because of the difficulty 
to determine the actual reference points for real world taxpayers. In the experiment 
describe in this paper, reference incomes for subjects participating in the experiment 
are induced artificially. In particular, subjects participating in the experiments are 
assigned to either one of two groups: a group of “poors” with low income; and a 
group of “riches” with higher income. We introduce a procedure to determine who is 
“reach” and who is “poor”, by which we assume that two subjects belonging to the 
two  different  groups,  can  nevertheless  be  thought    to  have  the  same  reference 
income. The two groups can thus be viewed corresponding to the groups of losers 
and  gainers  in  the  reference  dependent  terminology.  We  can  then  study  the 
behaviour of the subjects in the two groups in response to a change in marginal tax 
rates.  Our  preliminary  findings  support  the  prediction  of  the  reference  dependent 
specification, in that we find that subjects belonging to the group of “poors” respond 
with more tax evasion as the tax rate increases; whereas the subjects belonging to the 
group of “riches” respond with less evasion. 
The paper is organised as follows. Next section (section 2) outlines the basic 
tax evasion model under Prospect Theory. Section 3 presents the experimental set-up 
and section 4 the results. A brief final section (section 5) summarizes and draws 
conclusion.   4 
 
2. The basic ASY set-up and reference dependent preference 
 
In  this  section  we  review  the  basic  ASY  set-up,  emphasizing  how  the 
predictions of the standard expected utility model are affected adopting reference 
dependent preferences. We give here a synthetic presentation of the analysis more 
fully developed in Bernasconi and Zanardi (20021).  
In the standard ASY approach to income tax evasion, there is a taxpayer with 
income I, which is unknown to the government's tax collector. The taxpayer decides 
how  much  income  to  report,  D,  knowing  that  he  will  have  to  pay  taxes  on  the 
reported income at a flat rate t and that, with probability p, his declaration will be 
audited. If his tax return is audited, all his income will be discovered. The tax on any 
income found to have been concealed is subject to the higher rate t(1+s), where s is a 
strictly positive penalty surcharge. Formally, the taxpayer's problem is to choose D 
so as to maximise his expected utility (EU): 
EU ≡ (1 p)×u(I tD) + p×u(I tD t(1+s)E)           
  (1) 
where E≡I D is evaded income. 
  Denoting with Yna  and Ya the post-tax income in the case respectively of not 
an audit and in the case of an audit, that is Yna ≡I tD and Yna ≡ I tD t(1+s)E, the first 
order and second order conditions for an interior maximum are: 
FOC:  EU’ ≡  (1 p)×u’(Yna) +s p×u’(Yna)=0            (2) 
SOC:  H ≡ [(1 p)×u”(Ya)+ s
2 p×u”(Yas)] < 0           (3) 
Since u( ) is concave, the condition is satisfied in an interior if at E=0, (1 p 
ps) >0; this says that whenever the expected return per dollar of evaded taxes is 
strictly positive, a risk-averse taxpayer will always under-report his income. As it is 
known (see e.g. the classical paper by Skinner and Slemrod 1985), this is also a 
prediction  which  has  been  often  criticized  in  the  literature.  The  problem  is  in 
particular that the actual fiscal parameters of most countries are such that (1 p ps) 
>0, which according to the prediction would indeed imply that all taxpayers evade 
                                                           
1 There is a major simplification in the present discussion from the more proper application of Prospect Theory to tax evasion 
given in Bernasconi and Zanardi (2002). In particular, in the present analysis we abstract from the non-linear transformation of 
probabilities adopted by Prospect Theory, which however may important to explain other unsatisfactory predictions of the 
standard expected utility model not dealt with in details in this paper.    5 
part of their income. In the present paper we will abstract from this prediction and 
focus only on the comparative static implications of the model2.  
Various predictions can be derived in regard to the effect of a  change of 
parameters of the problem on the taxpayer’s decision to cheat. For example, intuitive 
predictions  which  can  be  easily  derived  are  that  increasing  respectively  the 
probability of audit p and the penalty surcharge s lead to an increase in reported 
income. For some other predictions it is necessary to make some further assumptions 
on the attitude towards risk of the taxpayer. Consider for example the effect of a 
change of pre-tax income I on evaded income E: 
¶E/¶I = 
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x - = r  is the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion. The sign of 
this  effect  is  in  general ambiguous,  but  assuming  DARA  (r’(x)<0),  the  effect  is 
positive.  
Similarly, for the effect of a change of the tax rate t, we have: 
¶E/¶t =  )] ( ) ( ) 1 ( )) ( ) ( ( [ ) ( ' ) 1 ( as na as na Y D I s Y Y D Y u p
H
t
r r r × - × + + - × × × - ×     (5) 
In  general,  the  effect  is  indeterminate;  under  DARA,  however,  the  effect  is 
unambiguously negative and hence the discussion of the introduction3. 
Consider now how the introduction of reference dependent preferences affect 
the above analysis. The essence of reference dependent preference is that well-being, 
rather  than  on  final  wealth  states,  depends  on distances from  a  neutral  reference 
point. In Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory, this is expressed by a value 
function  v(×),  defined  in  terms  of  gains  and  losses  and  having  two  important 
properties:  
a)  diminishing  sensitivity,  which  says  that  an  individual  is  risk  averse  in  the 
domain of gains, but risk loving in that of losses: v’’(x) < 0 and v’’( x) > 0, for x
³ 0 (where v’’(×) denotes the second derivative);  
                                                           
2 In this regard, we note however two points. Firstly, we recall that various studies (including Alm et al. 1992, Erard and 
Feinstein 1994, Bernasconi 1998) have shown how a typical argument developed by the literature on cognitive psychology, 
namely the fact that people tend to overweight small probabilities of extreme events, can correct the condition for the interior 
solution in a direction more consistent with empirical evidence. Secondly we emphasize that a fuller application of Prospect 
Theory to the present ASY set-up also adopts the over-weighting of small probabilities.  As already noted, we abstract from 
such feature of Prospect Theory in the following presentation. 
3 As already noted, recall that for the firm prediction of a negative effect is necessary both DARA and a penalty system in 
which sanction is proportional to evaded tax. In a system in which the sanction would instead be proportional to evaded income 
(as in the original Allingham and Samdo 1972) the indeterminacy would remain also under DARA.    6 
b)  loss aversion, which says that losses with respect to the reference point are more 
painful  than  corresponding  gains  are  satisfying.  This  means  that  the  value 
function at distance x from the reference point in the loss domain is steeper than 
the value function at distance x from the reference point in the gain domain, 
which  implies  that  the  value  function  has  a  kink  at  the  reference  point  (see 
Figure 1 below). 
Thus, assuming a reference dependent specification, the taxpayer’s problem is 
that of choosing D so to maximize the expression: 
p×v(I tD R) + p×v(I tD t(1+s)E R)            (6) 
where R represents the neutral reference point. Obviously, the determination of the 
reference point is a crucial aspect of this model, and we leave its discussion to the 
next section on the experimental design. Here we summarize the predictions of the 
model  in  terms  of  the  implied  differences  from  the  standard  expected  utility 
specification.  
Using the notation yna≡I tD R and yas≡I tD t(1+s)E R, the first order and second 
order conditions for interior solutions are: 
FOC:    (1 p)×v’(yna) + s p×v’(yas) = 0              (7) 
SOC:  H ≡ (1 p)×v”(yna)+ s
2 p×v”(yas)] < 0            (8) 
Note the similarity of these conditions with respect to the expected utility 
specification. We emphasize, however, that full similarity in predicted behavior is 
not in general guaranteed; but it depends on the relationship between the reference 
point R and the disposable income I(1 t), that the taxpayer would obtain paying all 
his tax liability.  
Consider firstly the case in which the latter is greater than the reference (that 
is (1 t) ³ R), so that the taxpayer is at certainty in the concave domain of the value 
function (see Figure 2.1a). We call this as the gain case. This case is indeed quite 
similar to the expected utility model. In particular, the condition for interior solution 
is  1 p ps  >0,  which  is  identical  to  the  expected  utility  case.  In  addition,  if  the 
taxpayer’s evasion is such that he remains in the gain domain even if caught (that is  




Formally, this can for example be shown for the predictions of the effect on 
evaded income E of a change in I and t, simply substituting in equations (5) and (6), 
respectively, v(yna) for u(Yna) and v(ya) for u(Ya): 
¶E/¶I = 
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Fig. 2.1  - Tax evasion with reference dependent preferences 
Fig. 1a - The gain case 
Fig. 1b - The loss case 
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where
) x ( ' v
) x ( " v
) x ( r - =  can be viewed as the analogue of the Arrow-Pratt index for v. 
Thus, if the individual is DARA in the gain domain (r’(x)<0), then ¶E/¶I is positive 
and ¶E/¶t is negative, as under the expected utility framework. 
Different predictions arise when R>(1 t), so that the taxpayer cannot remain 
with certainty in the gain domain even if he reports all his income. We call this 
situation as the loss case. It is depicted in Figure 2.1b. Notice, in particular, that since 
R>(1 t), ya will also be in the loss domain of the value function whichever decision 
the taxpayer will do. Given that in the loss domain the value function is convex, this 
also mean that for an interior solution to exist in this case, yna  be in the gain/concave 
domain4.  
  Consider now how the comparative static predictions of a change in I and t 
modify in this case. First of all, for the former effect (see equation 9), since v’’(yas) is 
positive  in  the  loss  domain,  r(yas)  <  0,  and  hence  ¶E/¶I  becomes  negative.  This 
prediction that in loss case an increase in pre-tax income brings about less evasion, 
may surprise at first. It has, however, a natural interpretation:  since in the loss case 
evasion essentially occurs in order to ensure to the taxpayer to obtain an income at 
least as great as the reference, it follows that when pre-tax income increases, there is 
less  need  to  evade  and  evasion  decreases  (contrary  to  the  EU/pure  gain  case). 
Regarding this prediction, we also note that  while some of the earliest empirical 
studies have generally reported a positive relationship between evasion and income, 
in a more recent and very thorough investigation, Feinstein (1991) didn’t report any 
clear relationship between the two variables. 
Consider now the effect of a change in the tax rate t. To this end, re-write 
equation (10) as:  
¶E/¶t =  )] ( " )) )( 1 ( ( ) ( " ) 1 [( as na y v D I s D s y v
H
t
- + + - × - × p p    
  (11) 
Given that in the loss case v’’(yna) is negative and v’’(yas) positive, it is immediate 
that ¶E/¶t is now positive. 
                                                           
4 Note also that this is only a necessary condition for interior solution. For sufficient conditions, one should instead consider 
further restrictions on the value function; in the following comparative exercise we more simply assume that conditions for 
interior solution exist and are satisfied.   9 
  Thus, in the loss case, the effects on evaded income of both an increase in the 
pre-tax income and in the tax rate are reversed with respect to the standard expected 
utility/gain  case.  In  the  remaining  part  of  the  paper  we  describe  an  experiment 




3. The experimental design 
 
Two  experimental  sessions  have  been  carried  out,  each  with  20  participants 
recruited  by  means  of  posters  put  up  on  the  bulletin  boards  of  the  Faculty  of 
Economics of the University of Trento. Both the experimental sessions have been 
built on three series of three rounds each and shared some common features. 
At the beginning of each experimental session the participants are requested to draw 
a ticket from a box. Accordingly with the colour of the ticket drawn – 50% of the 
tickets  are  white  and  50%  are  black  –the  subjects  receive  a  different  starting 
endowment for each series of rounds that can be of 150 euro-points or of 300 euro-
points. The starting endowments are then changed in real money at the end of the 
experiment, by using a converting scale that can produce a maximum earning of 25 
euros, depending on the performance of the player during the fiscal game. 
The participants were informed about the two levels of the initial endowments and 
the  random  assignment  of  the  roles  allows  to  introduce  an  artificial  effect  of 
reference point in the game. The assumption made by the experimental design is that 
the participants use the 150-300 euro-points scale as a base for their reference point. 
The  subjects  that  draw  a  “low  endowment”  ticket  assume  a  role  of  losers  when 
compared with those that drawn a “high endowment” ticket that assume the role of 
winners. 
The device then used in the experiment to reinforce the salience of the “artificial 
reference point” consists in assigning a work to each participant. The work must be 
done at the beginning of each series of rounds. The experimental subjects that extract 
a “high” endowment ticket must perform an heavier duty, while those that have a 
“low”  endowment  ticket  must  do  a  lighter  work.  The  work  assigned  to  the 
participants was to input in the computer some data to build a complete data set. A   10 
quite strong emphasis has been put on this stage of the experiment with the aim to 
increase  the  salience  of  the  relationship  between  the  amount  of  the  starting 
endowment and the mix randomness-effort of the rewarding mechanism. 
The tax rate at the beginning of both the experiments, i.e. for all the three rounds 
of  series  1,  is  of  10%,  then  it  raises  at  20%  in  the  second  series  of  rounds.  In 
experiment 1 the tax rate remains constant (i.e. 20%) also in the third series, while it 
rises  at  30%  in  experiment  2.  Another  difference  between  experiment  1  and 
experiment 2 is that in experiment 1 the roles of the participants are switched in the 
third series of rounds, the “heavy” (and richer) workers become “light” (and poorer) 
workers and vice-versa. In experiment 1 the roles of the participants is exchanged 
because  we  would  check  the  effects  produced  by  a  modification  of  the  artificial 
reference point. The hypothesis to test is related to the role played by the artificial 
reference point, more precisely we expect that a modification of the reference point 
should produce some form of “inverse effect” in the tax evasion propensity. 
The fiscal audits procedures used in the two experiments are slightly different and 
quite complex. In both the experiments we informed the participants that in each 
round there was a 30% probability to be audited and that the fine for a tax evasion 
was computed by adding the amount of the tax evaded to a penalty, which was equal 
to the amount of the tax evaded times three. This means that the final amount of the 
fine paid was four times the value of the tax evaded. To avoid the insurgence of 
effects  due  to  past  experiences  of  fiscal  audits  –  like  the  so  called  “bomb-crater 
effect” (Mittone 2002) – the subjects have been informed on the results from the 
fiscal audits only at the end of the experiment. 
The fiscal audits procedure in experiment 1 took place at the beginning of each 
round, by asking to each participant to draw from a box a ticket labelled with a code 
number that the subjects should input in the system through the computer screen – 
therefore each subjects did 9 drawings of code numbers during the whole experiment 
–.  The  subjects  were  informed  that  each  code  was  connected  to  a  dichotomous 
variable that could have the value “investigated” or “non-investigated”. The software 
did the rest of the job by linking automatically the participants’ tax choices to the 
code number and eventually to the fiscal audit. At the end of the experiment the 
subjects were informed on their auditing “story” and on the amount of fines possibly 
paid.   11 
In  experiment  2  the  structure  of  the  fiscal  audits  has  been  kept  substantially 
unchanged, the only modification introduced was at the beginning of the experiment 
when  we  shown  to  the  participants  14  tickets  labelled  “non  investigated”  and  6 
tickets labelled “investigated”. The tickets were put into 180 envelopes marked with 
a  number  code  and  immediately  stuck.  Successively  each  participant,  at  the 
beginning of each round, must drawn one of these envelopes from a box and input 
the code number in the computer screen. Like in experiment 1 also in experiment 2 at 
the end of the game the participants were informed on their fiscal audit story and 
could  control  the  correspondence  between  the  fiscal  audits  carried  out  and  the 
number codes, by opening the envelopes and looking at the tickets. 
The more complex audit procedure used in experiment 2 has been introduced to 
increase  the  salience  of  the  random  dimension  of  the  fiscal  audits  to  check  if  a 
stronger psychological stress on the “real” randomness of the game could play any 
difference in the results. 
Summarising the whole experiment works in this way: 
 
a)  each subject is assigned to a computer; 
b)  the experimenters read the instructions of the game together with the subjects; 
c)  the subjects drawn a ticket from a box and are assigned to the heavy (richer) 
workers group or to the light (poorer) workers group; 
d)  the participants do their work; 
e)  the  number  codes  (or  the  closed  envelopes  with  the  tickets)  for  the  fiscal 
audits  are  drawn  from  a  box  by  each  participant  at  the  beginning  of  each 
round; 
f)  the subjects input the code number in the computer screen and then choose to 
pay or to evade  (totally or partially) their taxes, following the information 
shown on the computer screen; 
g)  at  the  end  of  the  experiment  the  participants  are  informed  on  their  fiscal 
auditing story and receive their monetary reward. 
 
During the entire length of the experiment none can communicate with the other 
participants.  Questions  are  allowed  only  at  the  beginning  of  the  experiment  and 
immediately after the reading of the instructions.   12 
 
The structure of the two experimental sessions is the following: 
Experiment 1 
-  “standard” fiscal auditing procedure; 
-  three series of 3 rounds each; 
-  20 participants divided into two groups: 10 “heavy” workers (initial endowment 300 
euro points) and 10 “light” workers (initial endowment 150 euro points); 
-  switching of the roles at series 3, the heavy workers become light workers and vice-
versa; 
-  initial tax rate: 10% of the initial endowment for the first series of rounds then 20% 
till the end of the session. 
 
Experiment 2 
-  “complex” fiscal auditing procedure; 
-  three series of 3 rounds each; 
-  20 participants divided into two groups: 10 “heavy” workers (initial endowment 300 
euro points) and 10 “light” workers (initial endowment 150 euro points); 
-  initial tax rate: 10% of the initial endowment for the first series of rounds then 20% 
for the second series of rounds, finally 30% for the third series of rounds. 
   13 
4. The results 
 
A first picture of the results obtained from experiment 1 is reported in tab. 4.1 and in 
tab 4.2. Both tables 4.1 and 4.2 shown the percentage of tax evaded by each single 
player and the group average per each series of rounds.  
 
Tab. 4.1 - Experiment 1 - Percentage of tax evaded, individual players 
Round1  Round2  Round3  Round4  Round5  Round6  Round7  Round8  Round9 
Player  Group 
Euro pts. 150 Rate 10%  Euro pts. 150 Rate 20%  Euro pts. 300 Rate 20% 
0  1  15  15  15  30  30  30  60  60  60 
1  1  15  15  0  0  30  30  60  60  60 
2  1  0  15  15  0  30  29  0  0  60 
3  1  10  5  15  0  10  0  60  0  0 
4  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
11  1  13  5  15  18  2  30  60  22  43 
12  1  7  13  0  5  30  15  20  45  58 
15  1  15  15  15  30  30  30  60  60  60 
16  1  5  0  15  20  25  30  30  60  20 
19  1  10  15  0  30  20  20  0  60  50 
% tax evaded  71.67%  67.84%  70.00% 
    Euro pts. 300 Rate 10%  Euro pts. 300 Rate 20%  Euro pts. 150 Rate 20% 
5  2  23  20  15  40  30  40  10  10  15 
6  2  10  10  20  55  55  40  0  0  0 
7  2  20  30  0  50  0  20  0  0  0 
8  2  20  20  0  50  45  45  20  20  30 
9  2  0  25  25  50  55  60  27  27  30 
10  2  28  10  10  50  60  40  25  30  30 
13  2  0  0  0  60  60  60  30  30  30 
14  2  25  0  0  0  0  0  15  15  15 
17  2  25  18  30  45  55  60  30  28  30 
18  2  0  0  30  60  60  60  20  25  30 
% tax evaded  60.00%  39.29%  54.67% 
   14 
Tab. 4.2 - Experiment 2 - Percentage of tax evaded, individual players 
Round1  Round2  Round3  Round4  Round5  Round6  Round7  Round8  Round9 
Player  Group 
Euro pts. 150 Rate 10%  Euro pts. 150 Rate 20%  Euro pts. 150 Rate 30% 
0  1  15  12  15  0  30  30  45  0  45 
1  1  10  5  0  20  15  10  30  40  30 
3  1  6  13  12  30  25  30  45  45  45 
9  1  0  10  15  20  30  25  40  40  35 
10  1  5  8  0  30  30  30  45  45  45 
12  1  10  5  10  30  30  30  45  45  5 
13  1  10  0  5  25  25  25  35  40  30 
15  1  5  0  0  10  10  0  10  0  0 
16  1  0  0  0  20  20  20  0  0  0 
17  1  10  0  0  10  8  5  10  0  15 
% tax evaded  66.42%  48.60%  60% 
    Euro pts. 300 Rate 10%  Euro pts. 300 Rate 20%  Euro pts. 300 Rate 30% 
2  2  30  20  15  40  30  35  60  90  70 
4  2  30  30  30  30  60  60  90  60  90 
5  2  0  0  0  30  30  30  60  60  60 
6  2  0  0  30  0  0  30  30  30  30 
7  2  30  0  30  60  30  0  60  90  90 
8  2  0  0  0  40  40  0  80  0  90 
11  2  29  29  29  59  59  59  89  89  89 
14  2  30  30  30  60  60  60  90  60  90 
18  2  15  30  30  60  60  60  90  90  90 
19  2  5  5  30  60  30  30  45  90  80 
% tax evaded  71.18%  49.83%  35.06% 
 
There are two ways to analyse the results reported by tab. 4.1 and tab. 4.2, the first 
way is to look to the data “vertically” i.e. by confronting the data between the groups 
while the second way is to look at the differences within each  group during the 
experiment. A possible scheme to carry out this analysis, starting from experiment 1, 
is reported in fig. 4.1. Looking to the scheme the first comparison is only vertical 
because the participants have not yet a story. Using the Prospect Theory approach the 
participants belonging to group 1 (low starting endowment) should feel in a “losers” 
position  if  compared  with  their  mates  of  group  2  (high  starting  endowment). 
Defining respectively the members of group 1 as losers and the members of group 2 
as gainers means to assume that the reference point is somewhere between 150 € pts. 
and 300 € pts. On the other hand independently from the precise position of the 
reference point there are few doubts that the participants should “posit” themselves 
in the loss or in the gain region if they belong respectively to the first or to the 
second group.   15 
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Accordingly with this premise and going back to fig. 4.1 in series 1 (i.e. at time 
zero) the members of group 1, as losers, should evade more than the members of 
group 2 because the Prospect Theory assumes an higher risk propensity for those 
belonging  to  the  region  of  losses.  Looking  to  tab.  4.1  this  hypothesis  seemed 
confirmed  because  the  average  percentage  of  tax  evaded  in  series  1  by  the 
participants to group 1 is higher (71.7) that the percentage of group 2 (60.0). 
Moving to series 2 means to introduce a “history” in the game, therefore there is 
the possibility to make time series comparisons within the same group. The increase 
of  the  tax  rate  introduced  in  series  2  reduces  the  net  income  after  tax  and  this 
modification,  always  accordingly  with  Prospect  Theory,  should  increase  the  risk 
propensity of the losers from one hand while should decrease the risk attitude of the 
gainers. Looking to the results from the experiment one can notice that the Prospect 
Theory’s forecast is correct in the case of the gainers and wrong in the case of the 
losers. 
Finally the third series of rounds introduces a change in the relative positions of 
the players. Therefore the problem is to understand if the reference point changes, as 
a consequence of the reversal of the relative positions, or if it remain the same and 
the subjects shift their perspective accordingly. Accepting the first assumption, i.e. 
admitting that the subjects are psychologically influenced by their histories and make 
a re-positioning of the reference point there is no way to arrive to a definite forecast 
for their behaviours. An example of these psychological effect could be the raise of a 
sense of past “poverty” (or respectively of “richness”) and this feeling can influence 
the choice of the reference point after the income change. This could mean that the 
subjects consider not the income earned at each series of the experiment but the 
whole amount of € pts. obtained during the entire length of the game. 
On the other hand if we accept the assumption of that the subjects maintain their 
relative position towards the same reference point, i.e. assuming that they are not 
psychologically influenced by their histories – intending for “histories” the belonging 
in the past to a given group (losers or gainers) – and that they do not move from the 
losses (gains) sector. If this is the case those who have an increase in income should 
reduce their propensity to evade (losers) while, but as a consequence of the reduction 
in the level of income, the gainers should reduce the tax evasion. The results from 
experiment 1 seemed not confirming this second hypothesis.   17 
Looking  now  to  the  results  of  experiment  2  and  using  the  same  structure  of 
analysis  the  results  from  series  1  are  not  coherent  with  the  Theory  predictions 
because the percentage of tax evaded by group 1 (losers) is lower than that of group 
2  (gainers).  Similarly  the  Theory  is  not  confirmed  if  we  look  to  the  comparison 
between the results from series 1 and 2 of the losers because the percentage of tax 
evaded reduces while the Theory’s forecasts were of an increase. On the other hand 
for  the  gainers  group  the  Theory  is  confirmed  with  a  constant  reduction  of  the 
amount of tax evaded for the whole experiment. 
It is important to underline that the considerations till here done do not regard the 
statistical significance of the differences between the series/groups. As well known 
there are problems to compute a statistical test on differences between samples when 
the samples are in some way correlated. Here we could assume that the individual 
choices during the experiment have been done separately because the participants did 
not know if they have been investigated or not until the end of the whole experiment. 
Due to the ignorance of the results of the past decisions one can imagine that each 
individual choice in time is not correlated with the past ones. On the other hand this 
is  an  assumption  that  we  cannot  be  sure  is  true  because  some  form  of 
interdependence in the choices could have arisen during the game. In particular when 
we assume that the “history” of the game has an influence on the positioning of the 
reference point. 
In spite of these considerations we have nevertheless computed a Mann-Whitney 
test which results are reported in tab.4.3 and in tab. 4.4.  
 
Tab. 4.3 – Experiment 1 – Mann Whitney Test 
 
   Group1        Group2     Man-Whitney test 
Exp1  Srs1  Srs2  Srs3  Srs1  Srs2  Srs3 
   Srs1  -  0.704  0.888  0.338  -  - 
Group1  Srs2  0.704  -  0.820  -  0.017  - 
   Srs3  0.888  0.820  -  -  -  0.217 
   Srs1  0.338  -  -  -  0.035  0.604 
Group2  Srs2  -  0.017  -  0.035  -  0.129 
   Srs3  -  -  0.217  0.604  0.129  - 
Srs = series 
 
 
   18 
Tab. 4.4 – Experiment 2 – Mann Whitney Test 
 
   Group1        Group2     Man-Whitney test 
Exp2  Srs1  Srs2  Srs3  Srs1  Srs2  Srs3 
   Srs1  -  0.061  0.456  0.585  -  - 
Group1  Srs2  0.061  -  0.393  -  0.808  - 
   Srs3  0.456  0.393  -  -  -  0.057 
   Srs1  0.585  -  -  -  0.058  0.005 
Group2  Srs2  -  0.808  -  0.058  -  0.067 
   Srs3  -  -  0.057  0.005  0.067  - 
 
Looking to the results of the Mann Whitney test from tab. 4.3 it seemed that the 
behaviours  of  the  losers  group  (first  150  €  pts.  then  300  €  pts.)  during  the  first 
experiment (i.e. comparing between series) are not significantly different. A similar 
conclusion can be drawn also from the examination of the box and whisker plots 
reported in fig. 4.2. Looking to the graphs one can notice that the distributions of the 
percentage of tax evaded in the three series have almost the same median (the lines 
into the boxes) and a very similar averages (the small crosses within the boxes). 
More in general the size of the boxes (which include the 50% of the observations) 
and the length of the whiskers (which include the 95% of the observations) are very 
similar. 
 
Fig. 4.2 - Experiment 1 - percentage of tax evaded by group (€ pts. 150 then 300) 
 
 
Going back to tab. 4.3 and looking to the gainers group (first 300 € pts. then 150 € 
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between series 1  and series 2 is significantly different. Similarly but accepting  a 
lower level of significance (87% instead then 95%) also the behaviours in series 2 
and series 3 are significantly different. A confirmation of these results come also in 
this case from the box and whisker plot of fig. 4.3. Looking to the graphs it appears 
very clear that there is an higher concentration of behaviours in the low values of the 
distribution  during  series  2  while  both  series  1  and  3  shown  a  lower  level  of 
concentration and values nearer to the top of the distribution. 
 
Fig. 4.3 - Experiment 1 - percentage of tax evaded by group (€ pts. 300 then 150) 
 
Computing the Mann Whitney test between groups instead than between series 
one can notice that the only significant difference is between group 1 and 2 of series 
2  while  for  the  other  series  there  are  no  significant  differences  between  the  two 
groups. 
Coming  to  the  results  from  the  Mann  Whitney  test  computed  for  the  second 
experiment we should accept the null hypothesis for all the series of group 1 (i.e. it 
seemed that the differences between the series of the group of the losers are not 
significantly  different).  On  the  contrary  there  are  significant  differences  between 
series 1 and 3 for the gainers group and the significance level of the test is very near 
to the 0.05 also for series 1 with series 2 and for series 2 with series 3. It seemed 
therefore that the gainers behave in a quite different way for the whole experiment. 
These results are shown also from the graphs in fig.4.4 and 4.5. 
Confronting  the  percentage  of  tax  evaded  between  the  two  groups  the  only 
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Fig. 4.4 - Experiment 2 - percentage of tax paid by group (€ pts. 150) 
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